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Death Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Janet C. Hoeffel∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the forty-four years since the Court employed the Eighth 
Amendment to temporarily suspend the death penalty in the 
United States in Furman v. Georgia1 in 1972, the Court has 
spilled an enormous amount of ink attempting to instruct the 
states on how to properly guide jurors’ discretion in imposing 
the death penalty.  Yet, in its voluminous Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Justices spilled not one drop suggesting the 
familiar and unifying standard of beyond a reasonable doubt as a 
guide. 
The Court has finally and recently inched toward this 
standard in capital cases, not through an Eighth Amendment 
lens, but through the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.  In 
2000, Apprendi v. New Jersey2 was the Court’s watershed Sixth 
Amendment case marking the expansion of the jury trial right 
into new realms.  The Court brought its newly-minted jury trial 
analysis to bear in the penalty phase of capital cases in both Ring 
v. Arizona3 in 2002 and Hurst v. Florida4 in 2016.  In both cases,
the Court held that a jury, and not a judge, must find the 
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1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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aggravating factor or factors, at least one of which is necessary 
for a death verdict, and that the jury must find the existence of 
that factor or factors beyond a reasonable doubt.5 
This Article explains that a robust application of Apprendi 
to capital cases goes further than the narrow holdings of Ring 
and Hurst.  Justice Sotomayor strongly hints at this extension in 
her opinion for seven members of the Court in Hurst.6  The 
Court seems poised to go the next step.  To apply Apprendi in 
earnest is to apply it in light of the history of the jury trial and 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in capital cases.  The 
logic and language of Hurst v. Florida and the historical 
underpinnings of the right to have a jury make certain findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt lead to the conclusion that jurors 
must make all determinations necessary for the imposition of 
death beyond a reasonable doubt. 
While states have different statutory schemes for how death 
is decided, known as “weighing” versus “non-weighing” 
schemes, it makes little difference when applying the jury trial 
right.  If jurors have to find that aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors before death may be imposed, then jurors 
have to find that beyond a reasonable doubt.7  If jurors have to 
find the defendant represents a future danger in a non-weighing 
state, it must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.8  In all cases, 
in all schemes, the final judgment jurors must make is whether, 
in the end, death is the appropriate punishment.  This Article 
argues they must find this to be the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.9 
Because the Court is paying close attention to history in 
expanding the jury trial right into new realms, Part I of this 
Article sets out the history of the right to trial by jury and the 
origins of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, with a 
particular focus on capital cases.  It describes the importance of 
both to protect the collective rights of the people:  to have 
5. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.
6. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 142-43, 161-64, 179-80 and accompanying text.
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twelve members of the community unanimously decide death 
instead of a single jurist and to impose the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard on the decision, to protect those jurors from the 
angst of eternal damnation lest they are responsible for killing an 
innocent man. 
Part II then describes the Court’s own recent development 
of the jury trial right, relying heavily on history at the time of the 
founding of the nation.  In the non-capital arena, from Apprendi 
through Alleyne v. United States,10 the Court has viewed this 
right robustly and expansively.  In the capital arena, the Court 
has not yet had the opportunity to develop the right more fully, 
as the appellants in both Ring and Hurst asked a narrow, discrete 
question of the Court.  However, this Part describes how the 
language of Hurst demonstrates the Court recognizes the next 
steps.  This Part also gives the lay of the land, showing a deep 
split in the states as far as the use of reasonable doubt in the 
jury’s decision-making on the imposition of death. 
Part III brings history and Hurst’s logic and language 
together to demonstrate how, to comply with Apprendi, the jury, 
and not a judge, must decide the ultimate issue, separate and 
apart from preceding issues like the weighing decision.  One 
jurist has embraced this wholeheartedly.  In Rauf v. State,11 the 
Delaware Supreme Court issued a per curium opinion ruling 
Delaware’s death penalty statute unconstitutional in light of a 
broad reading of Hurst.12  Chief Justice Strine wrote separately, 
for three of the Justices: 
From the inception of our Republic, the unanimity 
requirement and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
have been integral to the jury’s role in ensuring that no 
defendant should suffer death unless a cross section of the 
community unanimously determines that should be the 
case, under a standard that requires them to have a high 
degree of confidence that execution is the just result.13 
10. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159-60, 2163-64 (2013).
11. 145 A.3d 430, 432-33 (Del. 2016).
12. Id. at 434.
13. Id. at 437.
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The logic, history, and conclusion, are inescapable, and the 
Court appears willing to entertain the conclusion if presented 
with the question. 
II. HISTORY OF JURY TRIALS AND BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT:  COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF 
THE COMMUNITY 
In modern day practice and language, the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial belongs to the criminal 
defendant14 and the due process clause gives the defendant the 
right to make the prosecution prove its case against him beyond 
a reasonable doubt.15  These rights inure to the benefit of the 
individual criminal defendant, who otherwise would be left to 
the discretion of one jurist with no standards to guide him. 
While it is certainly and undeniably true that these are 
individual rights of the defendant, they are also both, now and 
historically, rights of the community.16  Often forgotten, it 
seems, is the history of both the jury trial and the reasonable 
doubt standard as stemming from the concerns of the 
community, most particularly in capital cases.  This section will 
explore the history of these two intertwined features of the 
criminal justice system to demonstrate their origin as collective 
rights of the community. 
14. See U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered.  [The defendant’s] right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order 
to prevent oppression by the Government.”). 
15. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (“The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility he 
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be 
stigmatized by the conviction.  Accordingly, a society that values the good name and 
freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when 
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). 
16. This is not an unusual feature of criminal procedure rights.  For example, as
practiced, Batson v. Kentucky gives the criminal defendant an equal protection right to a 
jury of his peers.  469 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1989).  Batson, however, stems from the equal 
protection right of the community to serve as jurors.  Id. at 99. 
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A. The Community’s Right to Decide Punishment in 
Capital Cases 
The history of the jury trial right illuminates it as a 
collective right of the people to stand in the place of the 
sovereign to impose punishment on anyone.  Given that the 
consequences of a determination of guilt was typically death, 
“the jury trial right, for the British colonies and later the 
confederation of states, was primarily about the fledgling 
American community’s ability to judge its own people and 
pronounce their punishment.”17  It is therefore simultaneously a 
collective right of the people to judge and the individual right of 
the defendant to be judged by his peers. 
The influential thinkers for the Founders—Sir Edward 
Coke, Matthew Hale, Cesare Beccaria, and especially William 
Blackstone—wrote of the jury trial right as a public institution.18  
William Blackstone explained the jury right as belonging to the 
individual in the grand jury context and the community in the 
petit jury context: 
[T]he founders of the English laws have with excellent 
forecast contrived, that no man should be called to answer 
to the king for any capital crime, unless upon the 
preparatory accusation of twelve or more of his fellow 
subjects, the grand jury: and that the truth of every 
accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, 
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by 
the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and 
neighbours, indifferently chosen, and superior to all 
suspicion.19 
The jury trial was the right of the community “to guard 
against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,” 
and “was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in 
17. Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397,
399 (2009). 
18. Id. at 415-18 (dissecting the works of these thinkers to demonstrate their focus
on the right as collective not individual). 
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 343 (4th
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1770) (emphasis added). 
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the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and 
political liberties.”20 
Further, Blackstone said, “The right of punishing belongs 
not to any one individual in particular, but to the society in 
general[.]”21  From the founding, the jury’s role as the sentencer 
in capital cases “was unquestioned.”22  Because trials were not 
bifurcated, “[t]he question of guilt and the question of death 
both were decided in a single jury verdict at the end of a single 
proceeding conducted as an adversarial trial.”23 
In England, until 1957, murder—and over 200 other 
crimes—was punishable by a mandatory sentence of death.24  
Similarly in the colonies, and at the time of the founding, almost 
all felonies carried the death penalty.25  Imprisonment and 
degrees of murder were innovations not yet developed as 
alternatives.26  Jurors exercised mercy in cases where they 
20. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (quoting 2 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 
1873)); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 106 (1998) (noting the jury trial right “was not simply and always an 
individual right but also an institution of localism and popular sovereignty”); Stephanos 
Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, 
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?,  94 GEO. L.J. 183, 196-97 (2005) (noting that 
the original jury trial right in the Constitution “was meant to be a right of We the People to 
administer justice”). 
21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 364 (emphasis added); see also Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2013) (“Consistent with this connection between 
crime and punishment, various treatises defined ‘crime’ as consisting of every fact which 
‘is in law essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted,’ or the whole of the wrong ‘to 
which the law affixes . . . punishment.’”). 
22. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710-11 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital 
Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1989)). 
23. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1972 (2005). 
24. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
25. “At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791,” all of the States made
a death sentence mandatory for “a considerable number of crimes, typically including at a 
minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy.”  Id. 
26. It was not until 1794 that Pennsylvania was successful in reforming the law,
dividing murder into degrees.  Id. at 290.  Nonetheless, a conviction for first-degree murder 
still required imposition of a mandatory death sentence; a term of imprisonment was 
imposed for second-degree murder.  See id. at 290-91.  Other states followed suit or kept 
the old law.  Either way, a jury verdict of guilty of capital murder meant an automatic death 
sentence throughout the United States until the mid-1800s.  Id. at 291.  Beginning with 
Tennessee in 1838, States began to “abandon mandatory death sentences in favor of 
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believed the death penalty was too harsh by acquitting the 
defendant.27  Rather than finding this an abdication of duty, this 
exercise of mercy was considered a primary function of the 
community.  John Adams wrote, “It is not only [the juror’s] 
right, but his duty . . . to find the verdict according to his own 
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct 
opposition to the direction of the court.”28  Adams endorsed the 
jury trial right as emanating “from the mass of the people, and 
no man can be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or 
reputation, without the concurrence of the voice of the people.”29 
In Duncan v. Louisiana,30 hailed as the signature case 
establishing a criminal defendant’s individual right to a jury 
trial, the Court also underscored the fundamental right to a jury 
trial as a community right:  “Fear of unchecked power, so 
typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, 
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon 
community participation in the determination of guilt or 
innocence.”31  The Court explained that the jury trial came to 
America with the “strong support” of the English colonists: 
Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply resented. 
Among the resolutions adopted by the First Congress of the 
American Colonies . . . on October 19, 1765—[considered 
as stating] “the most essential rights and liberties of the 
colonists”—was the declaration: “That trial by jury is the 
inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in 
these colonies.”32 
discretionary death penalty statutes.”  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291.  By 1920, approximately 
40 states had made death sentences discretionary for first-degree murder and other capital 
offenses.  Id.  
27. As the Court explained in Woodson, “At least since the Revolution, American
jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants 
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict.”  428 U.S. at 
293. 
28. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 255 (Charles Francis Adams, ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865). 
29. Id. at 253.
30. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. Id. at 156.
32. Id.
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Further, the Duncan Court recounted, the First Continental 
Congress, in the resolve of October 14, 1774, objected to trials 
before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries 
and to trials in England for alleged crimes committed in the 
colonies; the Congress therefore declared  “[t]hat the respective 
colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more 
especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by 
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.”33 
The Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress, held in 
Philadelphia, September 5, 1774, mimicked Blackstone’s 
description of the jury trial right as the collective right of the 
people and the individual right of the accused: 
The next great right is that of trial by jury.  This provides, 
that neither life, liberty nor property can be taken from the 
possessor, until twelve of his unexceptional countrymen 
and peers, of his vicinage, who from that neighbourhood 
may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his 
character, and the characters of the witnesses, upon a fair 
trial, and full enquiry face to face, in open Court, before as 
many of the people as chuse [sic] to attend, shall pass their 
sentence upon oath against him . . . .34 
After a thorough review of this history, Laura Appleman 
concludes, “[T]he Continental Congress thought it important to 
not only mention trial by jury, but also to explain that this jury 
trial right was public, expressive, and local . . . . Popular 
understanding of the jury trial right would have unquestionably 
seen it as a right of the community, no matter where or how it 
was inserted into the Constitution.”35 
33. Id.
34. Appleman, supra note 17, at 421-22 (quoting U.S. CONT’L CONG., JOURNAL OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, SEPTEMBER 5, 1774, at 
121 (1774)); see also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (2013) (“It also 
preserves the historic role of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal 
defendants.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a 
jury obviously lies in [its] interposition between the accused and his accuser.”); see supra 
note 14, 20 and accompanying text. 
35. Appleman, supra note 17, at 426, 438.  Justice White for the Court in Duncan
also underscored the collectivity of the right: 
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a 
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to 
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When death was on the table, the community was entitled 
to interpose itself, in the form of a jury, between the accused and 
the sovereign.36  As the next section demonstrates, this was the 
case for hundreds of years, beginning in the thirteenth century.37 
B. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt as the Moral 
Conscience of the Community 
As with the right to a jury trial, the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard has both a collective and individual aspect.  The 
modern rationale for the standard bears little relation to its 
history, but this is not to say either need be jettisoned.  They can 
be reconciled.  The modern rationale was expressed in 1970 in 
In re Winship,38 where the Court held that the requirement that 
the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was a 
requirement of the Constitution under the Due Process Clause.39 
The Court expressed this due process right as inuring to the 
benefit of the criminal defendant.  The “reasonable doubt” 
requirement “has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure for 
cogent reasons.”40  The prosecution subjects the criminal 
defendant both to “the possibility that he may lose his liberty 
upon conviction and . . . the certainty that he would be 
stigmatized by the conviction.”41  This procedural protection 
entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or 
to a group of judges.  Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and 
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law 
in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt 
or innocence.  The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in 
serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement 
qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
36. See White, supra note 22, at 10 (“[B]y the time [of] the Bill of Rights . . . the
jury’s role in finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for 
capital punishment was particularly well established.”). 
37. To have one jurist put a man to death, as was the case in Alabama until 2017, see
infra note 109, and is currently the case in Montana, see infra note 109, was simply 
unthinkable for hundreds of years both before and after the founding of our nation. 
38. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39. Id. at 364.
40. Id. at 363.
41. Id.
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“provides concrete substance for the presumption of 
innocence”42 and reduces the risk of erroneous convictions. 
However, the Court also expressed a shade of the history of 
the reasonable doubt rule when it described it as essential to 
ensure only the guilty are “condemned”: 
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to 
command the respect and confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law.  It is critical that the moral 
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are 
being condemned.43 
Going back in time, we see that it is the “moral force” of 
the standard in protecting the community that brought it about. 
The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard emerged into 
use in the eighteenth century as the product of a history of 
Christian juries fearful of the moral consequences of returning 
guilty verdicts.44  Along with the requirement of a unanimous 
verdict of twelve jurors, it was a “moral comfort” rule, not a 
guide to fact finding.45  When it first appeared in the Boston 
Massacre trial in Robert Paine’s closing argument in 1770, its 
use was meant to ease the jurors’ path to conviction.46 
The origin of the jury trial itself, as a replacement to 
decision-making by judges, was tied to the anxieties of judges in 
returning guilty verdicts in cases of blood punishments and 
death.  If perchance a judge convicted an innocent man, it was a 
mortal sin in the older Christian tradition.47  Because of the 
judicial discomfit, by the thirteenth century, England had 
developed the criminal jury trial as we know it today.48  Now it 
42. Id.  The Court in Jackson v. Virginia described the reasonable doubt standard in
similar terms:  “[B]y impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of 
near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our 
society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.”  443 U.S. 307, 315 
(1979).  
43. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
44. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 3 (2008). 
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 138.
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was to be jurors, not judges, who had to bear the potential moral 
consequences of sitting in judgment in blood cases. 
By the end of the Middle Ages, jurors found some salvation 
in the “special verdict,” where they could find facts only and 
leave the judgment to the judge.49  As explained by legal 
historian James Whitman: 
Death and doubt:  these were the great issues.  Sir Edward 
Coke too cited the same doctrine at the end of the century. 
For him too the need for special verdicts arose in cases 
where the jury experienced doubt:  “[N]ote, reader, in all 
cases where the jurors find the special matter doubtful in 
law pertinent and tending to the issue which they are to try, 
there the Court ought to accept it.” Death and doubt 
presented the great challenges for the criminal jury.50 
In the seventeenth century, jurors lost the right to a special 
verdict and then regained it and, similarly, lost and regained the 
relief of the benefit of clergy (which assignment allowed the 
accused to escape punishment).51  Additionally, jurors had the 
option of transporting the condemned to the colonies as another 
method to escape the moral stain of blood punishments.52  
However, that option came to an end with the American 
Revolution.53 
Without the option of transportation, jurors in the 1780s 
understandably often refused to find guilt in cases of blood 
punishment and death, believing they themselves faced potential 
damnation.54  Theological tracts and moral philosophers in the 
eighteenth century emphasized in cases of any doubt, jurors 
should take the “safer side” or the “safer path.”55  Hence, jurors 
acquitted.56  Because execution was the usual punishment and 
49. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 157.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 187.
54. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 187; see also id. at 174 (noting the “safer path”
doctrine, including in Sir Matthew Hale’s HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736), 
where he writes “[W]hen you are in doubt, do not act, especially in Cases of Life”).  
55. Id. at 199.
56. Id. at 199, 200.
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transportation to the colonies was not an alternative, the moral 
concerns of the jurors did not dissipate by the eighteenth 
century, even though blood punishments were rare.  James 
Whitman posits we may not have seen the emergence of 
reasonable doubt if execution were not the usual punishment.57 
Reasonable doubt as a moral concept, making its debut in 
England in the 1780s, was a response to the “timidity” of jurors 
who experienced “a general dread lest the charge of innocent 
blood should lie at their doors.”58  Jurors so instructed, could 
convict if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
opposed to all doubt:59 
[The theology of reasonable doubt] was designed to quell 
fears about the responsibility for judgment, not to resolve 
factual mysteries.  It was designed to coax jurors into 
acting, in situations in which they felt uneasy about the 
“perilous” task of condemning others.60 
Importantly, the moral focus was not on the finding of 
facts, which had always been more of a given than they are 
57. Id. at 187.
58. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 4.
59. For a time, the phrasing of the matter of proof in moral evidence was beyond any
doubt.  See Barbara J. Shapiro, “To a Moral Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and 
Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 179-80 (1986) (“It was the 
‘indispensable duty’ of the judges in charging the jury to ask ‘whether they are satisfied, 
beyond the probability of doubt, that the defendant is guilty.’”); see also S. PHILLIPS, 
THEORY OF PRESUMPTIVE PROOF 58 (1814) (stating “that the ‘impression in the mind of a 
jury in a criminal case’ must not be ‘that the prisoner is probably guilty, but that he really 
and absolutely is so.’  If the jury had doubts, they were to acquit.”); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, 
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 33 (1991) (“Moral evidence was to be 
distinguished from demonstration, which led to absolute certainty, for the proofs involved 
in moral evidence were fallible.  They, therefore, could not produce absolute certainty but 
only ‘probable judgment, or at most moral certainty.’  Probability, however, might ‘rise so 
high, as to exclude all reasonable doubt.’”). 
60. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 204.  Erik Lillquist agrees that “[i]t seems likely
that the rise of the reasonable doubt standard was related to the increasing resistance of the 
public—both American and British—to the application of the capital sanction.”  Erik 
Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 51 (2005).  
See also Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of 
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 148-49, 149 n.206-07 (2002) (giving views of 
nineteenth-century commentators); Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable 
Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of 
Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1195 (2003) (“[T]he early life of the reasonable-
doubt instruction appears to [have been] limited solely to capital trials . . . .”). 
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today, but on the morality of punishment.61  As eloquently put 
by James Whitman, “There is nothing in that phrase [reasonable 
doubt] that tells us how to go about determining uncertain facts 
in any rational or scientific way.  The phrase tells us a great 
deal, though, about how to feel easy in our consciences when we 
condemn others.”62 
By the end of the eighteenth century the concepts of moral 
certainty and proof beyond reasonable doubt were interwoven in 
the treatises and literature.63  There is little debate among 
scholars that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was equated with 
moral certainty.64  Because trials were not based on scientific, 
demonstrable proof, but witness reports (called “moral 
evidence”), moral certainty was “the highest degree of certitude 
based on such evidence.”65  If one had real doubts, moral 
certainty was not reached.66  “At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, proof beyond all reasonable doubt was the most popular 
version [of the standard].”67  Instructions to jurors were guides to 
61. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 209.
62. Id. at 204.
63. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 185 (explaining how Thomas Starkie’s Practical
Treatise on the Law of Evidence was influential into the nineteenth century and reflected 
the modern standard; it said, “Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of 
the fact in dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full proof 
of the fact.” (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
(2d ed. London 1833)). 
64. See Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 111 (1999); Shapiro, supra 
note 59, at 170-71. 
65. Solan, supra note 64, at 111; see also Shapiro, supra note 59, at 175 (“The
addition of the concept of moral certainty reflected the desire to make legal language 
consistent with the philosophical terminology of the day.  This terminology, however 
foreign to modern ears, was part of the language and discourse of the educated classes in 
both England and America.  ‘Satisfied conscience,’ ‘reasonable doubt,’ and ‘moral 
certainty’ were widely used concepts, and these and related terms were to be found in 
moral, theological, historical, and philosophical as well as legal discourse.”). 
66. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 177 (“John Morgan’s 1789 Essay Upon the Law of
Evidence similarly relied on a Lockean conception of knowledge . . . [He said that] [t]he 
mind ‘ought not any longer to doubt but, to be nearly if not as perfectly well-satisfied as if 
we of ourselves knew the fact.’  Morgan’s ‘satisfaction’ was also synonymous with judicial 
demands for jury ‘satisfaction’ or ‘satisfied conscience.’  Jury verdicts must be based on 
the very highest knowledge available to man in matters of fact.”).  
67. Solan, supra note 64, at 110 n.23.  As Barbara Shapiro uncovers, Simon
Greenleaf’s Treatise on the Law of Evidence, “a famous nineteenth-century American 
treatise,” explained it in a manner that comes closest to more modern jury instructions: 
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moral persuasion and satisfaction and not intended to do the 
work of “finding facts.”68 
The next section describes the Court’s own efforts at 
describing and filling out a jury trial right, with its attendant 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, using a historical 
analysis.  While its interpretation of the history expands the 
application of the jury trial right, its goals have been limited in 
the capital context, and its historical unearthing incomplete.  
This Article will demonstrate there is room and intention for this 
doctrine to expand further in the penalty phase of a capital trial. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE PRE-HURST 
A. Non-Capital Application from Apprendi to Alleyne 
Since the year 2000,69 the Court has been on a steady path 
to define and expand the parameters of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial consistent with its understanding of the right 
at the time of this nation’s founding.  The intention of the Court 
has not been to contract, expand, or change the right but to 
Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not 
only that kind of evidence, which is employed on subjects connected with 
moral conduct, but all the evidence, which is not obtained either from 
intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not 
require demonstrative evidence . . . and to insist upon it would be 
unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things is, 
that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them . . . . By satisfactory 
evidence . . . is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an 
unprejudiced mind beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances, which will 
amount to this degree of proof, can never be previously defined; the only 
legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind 
and conscience of a common man, and so to convince them, that he would 
venture to act upon that conviction, in the matters of the highest concern and 
importance to his own interest. 
Shapiro, supra note 59, at 189 (quoting SIMON GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 4-5 (2d ed. Boston 1844)). 
68. Shapiro, supra note 59, at 155-56.
69. The effort started a year earlier in Jones v. United States, where the Court noted
that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases 
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
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interpret its application properly according to its roots.  The 
result has been its steady expansion into realms not in existence 
at the time of the founders. 
The watershed case in this interpretative effort is Apprendi 
v. New Jersey.70  New Jersey’s statute had authorized a trial
judge, after a guilty verdict, to impose an extended term of 
imprisonment if she found that the crime was, in essence, a 
“hate crime.”71  The judge so found in Apprendi’s case.72  In 
reversing that enhanced portion of the sentence, the Court held 
that: 
[The procedure violated two] constitutional protections of 
surpassing importance:  the proscription of any deprivation 
of liberty without “due process of law,” and the guarantee 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”  
Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal 
defendant to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”73 
The Court incorporated the history of the jury trial “as the 
great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties,”74 quoting 
Blackstone on the importance of judgment by members of the 
community75 and finding it in the company of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.76  Relying on the time period of our nation’s 
founding, the Court wrote that there was no known “distinction 
70. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
71. Id. at 468-69.
72. Id. at 471.
73. Id. at 476-77.
74. Id. at 477 (quoting STORY, supra note 20, at 540-541).
75. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (noting that “trial by jury has been understood to
require that ‘the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, 
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of 
twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbours . . . .’”) (emphasis in original). 
76. Id. at 478 (stating that simultaneously, and “[e]qually well founded is the
companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
‘demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed 
from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” seems to have occurred as late as 1798.’”).  Note that according to James Whitman, 
the Court gets this wrong:  as has been discussed, jurors had been using a higher standard 
of no doubt and “reasonable doubt” was brought into play to allay their moral fears about 
convicting an innocent man.  Whitman, supra note 44, at 193-94. 
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between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a ‘sentencing 
factor’” in any criminal proceeding.77  Recognizing unitary trials 
were the norm, the Court said, “The defendant’s ability to 
predict with certainty the judgment from the face of the felony 
indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment 
with crime.”78  A finding of guilt by the jury dictated the 
sentence the judge would pronounce.79 
Therefore, the Court held that regardless of New Jersey’s 
claim that the hate crime enhancement was a “sentencing factor” 
for the judge’s determination and not an “element” of the crime, 
“the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment 
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”80  The Court 
easily held that answer was yes in Apprendi, holding that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”81  It is this last phrasing that became the 
clarion call for future cases. 
In Blakely v. Washington,82 an extension of Apprendi that 
invalidated much of Washington’s sentencing guidelines,83 
77. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
78. Id. at 478-79 (“[A]fter verdict, and barring a defect in the indictment, pardon, or
benefit of clergy, ‘the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to 
the crime’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 369-70 (1769) (emphasis added by Court)).  A jury proceeded upon “an 
indictment containing ‘all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence . . . 
stated with such certainty and precision, that the defendant . . . may be enabled to 
determine the species of offence they constitute, in order that he may prepare his defence 
accordingly . . . and that there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, 
if the defendant be convicted.’”  Id. at 478 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, 
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862) (emphasis added by 
Court)). 
79. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
80. Id. at 494; see also id. at 484 (“If a defendant faces punishment beyond that
provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not 
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are 
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not—at the moment the State is 
put to proof of those circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, until that point, 
unquestionably attached.”). 
81. Id. at 490.
82. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2017] DEATH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 283
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, “[T]he relevant ‘statutory 
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose 
without any additional findings.”84  This re-phrasing of the 
holding is critical when considering the penalty phase of a 
capital case.  As will be discussed more fully below, most jurists 
make the mistake of thinking the jury trial guarantee is fulfilled 
once a defendant is found “death eligible,” typically defined as 
once an aggravating factor is found.  But that finding is only one 
of the findings that must be made before the maximum penalty 
of death may be imposed.85 
While there are more cases in the Court’s Apprendi line in 
the non-capital arena,86 Alleyne v. United States87 is noteworthy 
because it demonstrates the Court’s devotion to Apprendi’s 
expansive meaning, regardless of the cost.  In Alleyne, the Court 
overruled its own post-Apprendi opinion to find that any fact 
that increases mandatory minimum sentence for crime is an 
element of the crime that must be submitted to a jury and found 
beyond a reasonable doubt.88  Overturning Harris v. United 
States,89 the Court clarified that it meant what it said when it said 
83. See id. at 305.  Blakely foreshadowed the ultimate invalidation of much of the
federal sentencing guidelines by the Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
84. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-304.
85. As applied to a capital case, John Douglass observed that a defendant cannot be
sentenced to death upon finding of the alleged aggravating factor or factors alone, unless 
that is all that is presented at sentencing. Douglass, supra note 23, at 2004-05.  Rather, 
“[a]fter Furman, Woodson, and Lockett v. Ohio, no death sentence can ever be imposed 
even on a death-eligible defendant until the sentencer considers ‘any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”  Id.  John Douglass has 
pointed out the gamesmanship that can emerge from distinguishing “eligibility” 
aggravating factors that are charged in the indictment by the prosecution, and therefore 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, from other aggravating evidence not officially 
charged.  Id. at 2001-2002.  For example, the prosecutor could list “pecuniary gain” as the 
sole statutory aggravator that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but nonetheless 
put on evidence that the defendant used torturous means, not subject to such any standard 
of proof for the jury.  Id. 
86. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348-49 (2012);
Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 226-27 (2005).  
87. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
88. Id. at 2155.
89. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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in Apprendi that the question is “one not of form, but of 
effect.”90  The jury must make the finding, whether it is one that 
increases the minimum or the maximum.  Alleyne represents the 
Court’s willingness to upend years of practice and its own 
supporting precedents in its stolid devotion to the jury trial right. 
B. Apprendi in the Capital Penalty Phase:  Ring v. 
Arizona 
Falling directly in line with the holding of Apprendi, the 
Court did not balk in applying it to the penalty phase of a capital 
case.  In Ring v. Arizona,91 the Court invalidated the procedure 
in Arizona whereby, following a jury adjudication of a 
defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge, sitting 
alone, determined the presence or absence of aggravating 
factors, at least one of which was required by Arizona law to 
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.92  Instead, 
applying Apprendi’s holding, the Court held that “the required 
finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a 
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty 
verdict”93 and therefore had to be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.94 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, writing separately to note 
his own personal conundrum with the Eighth Amendment 
edifice the Court had built post-Furman, but endorsing a robust 
Sixth Amendment analysis, famously stated that findings 
“essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the 
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of 
90. 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
91. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
92. Id. at 592-93 (“At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to
determine the presence or absence of the enumerated ‘aggravating circumstances’ and any 
‘mitigating circumstances.’  The State’s law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant 
to death only if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and ‘there are no mitigating 
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’”). 
93. Id. at 604.
94. Arizona’s statute already included the requirement, so the issue in Ring was
whether a judge could make this finding.  Id. at 597.  Justice Scalia in concurrence 
explicitly stated the aggravating factors “must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt” under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”95  Although unhappy with 
the requirement of aggravating factors, he nonetheless agreed 
that they must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.96  
In strong terms, he stated: 
[O]ur people’s traditional belief in the right of trial by 
jury is in perilous decline.  That decline is bound to be 
confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated 
spectacle of a man’s going to his death because a judge 
found that an aggravating factor existed.  We cannot 
preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in 
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for 
that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty 
without it.97 
This position represents a strong signal that the Sixth 
Amendment may have more pedigree to guide juries in 
imposing death than the Eighth Amendment.98 
The Court was keen to note that the question presented in 
Ring was “tightly delineated”;99 the defendant “contend[ed] only 
that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the 
aggravating circumstances against him.”100  The Court noted, 
“He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to the 
mitigating circumstances.  Nor does he argue that the Sixth 
Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate 
determination whether to impose the death penalty.”101  The 
95. Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. In his view, the edifice of aggravating circumstances in statutes, built by states
largely in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and subsequent Supreme 
Court case law, is not required under the Constitution.  See id.  Yet, once built, his devotion 
to the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement commands the result in Ring.  Id. at 612. 
97. Id.  Note that Justice Scalia stated his belief that a judge in Arizona could still
make the ultimate life or death decision once the jury had found an aggravating factor.  Id.  
This Article’s point is to demonstrate that history and logical progression of the Court’s 
case law command that a jury make this decision. 
98. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).  In Ring, Justice Breyer did
not join the opinion but concurred in the result believing that the Eighth Amendment, and 
not the Sixth Amendment, requires jury sentencing in capital cases.  Id. 
99. Id. at 597 n.4.
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976), an Eighth Amendment 
case where a plurality of the Court said, “[I]t has never [been] suggested that jury 
sentencing is constitutionally required.”). 
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Court was also not presented with the question of whether the 
finding that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors 
was a finding that increased the maximum punishment that 
could be imposed and therefore needed to be made by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This noted reference to the narrowness of the question 
presented foreshadowed the Court’s more expanded discussion 
of the factfinding in capital cases that should fall in line in Hurst 
v. Florida.102  Indeed the Court closes its opinion in Ring with
the broad statement, “The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it 
encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s 
sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put 
him to death.”103 
III. HURST V. FLORIDA
Hurst v. Florida104 sets a course for an expanded jury trial 
right in capital cases, one that is true to its origins.  Reading 
Justice Sotomayor’s words, for seven members of the Court, 
leaves little doubt that the Court is laying down tracks.  The 
logical progression after Hurst is to demand that all findings—
whether in the form of weighing or not—required for imposition 
of death, including the finding that death is the appropriate 
punishment, be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
First, to understand the potential impact of Hurst and its logical 
extension, we need a snapshot of the statutory schemes in place 
for capital punishment before the Court decided the case. 
A. The Lay of the Land Pre-Hurst 
Of those thirty-two jurisdictions that have the death 
penalty,105 the map of the use of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
102.  136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
103.  536 U.S. at 609. 
104.  136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
105.  Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and the United 
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standard at any point in the penalty process is a patchwork.  In 
nine “weighing” states, jurors must use a reasonable doubt 
standard at the weighing stage:  either they must find that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before they are 
authorized to impose the death penalty or they must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any mitigating 
circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances.106  Of those nine states, Utah also requires 
additionally that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard be 
applied to the ultimate decision: 
The death penalty shall only be imposed if, after 
considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and 
is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate 
in the circumstances.107 
Similarly, but not as broadly, in Washington, a “non-
weighing” state, the trial court instructs the jury “to deliberate 
upon the following question: ‘Having in mind the crime of 
which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient 
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?’”108 
On the other hand, there is the possibility of completely 
eschewing a jury trial right: before Hurst four states allowed the 
States Government.  See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/MGB5-4H6F]. 
106.  For Arkansas, see ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (2013).  For Colorado, see 
Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003) (en banc); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 
786, 792 (Colo. 1990) (en banc).  For Kansas, see PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS 
CRIMINAL 54.060 (4th ed.) (West 2016).  For Missouri, see State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 
253, 256-63 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  For North Carolina, see N.C.P.I.-CRIM. 150.10 for jury 
instructions.  For Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 2017) (proposed 
legislation).  For Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (West 2014).  For 
Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (5)(b) (West 2016); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 
83-84 (Utah 1982)).  For Wyoming, see Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo. 2003). 
107.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (5)(b) (West 2016) (emphasis added). 
108.  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (West 2016). 
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judge to usurp the jury’s decision-making, whether by calling 
the jury’s decision merely advisory, allowing a judicial override, 
or by making the decision alone.109  In addition, ten “weighing” 
jurisdictions (nine states and the federal government) use 
language that jury findings of aggravating factors must 
“outweigh” or “sufficiently outweigh” mitigating circumstances, 
but with no standard for the weighing.110  Five more states do 
109.  For Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2017) (proposed 
legislation) (“When a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense for which the 
sentence of death may be imposed, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the 
guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the 
existence or nonexistence of the circumstances set forth in 46-18-303 and 46-18-304 for 
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed.  The hearing must be conducted 
before the court alone.”).  Alabama allowed for a judicial override of a jury’s 
recommendation of life until 2017, when the legislature finally eliminated judicial override. 
See Alabama Ends Death Penalty by Judicial Override, USNEWS, (Apr. 11, 2017, 
6:30PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-11/alabama-
ends-death-penalty-by-judicial-override [https://perma.cc/2JF8-2Z74]; Ala. Code. 1975 § 
13A-5-47(a) (2017).  Florida’s scheme was struck down by the Hurst decision.  See 136 S. 
Ct. 616, 616-18 (2016).  Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court held its state scheme 
unconstitutional after Hurst in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-34 (Del. 2016). 
110.  For Arizona, see State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193, 1218-19 (Ariz. 2005) (en 
banc) (finding Arizona’s death penalty scheme constitutional even though it provides “no 
objective standards to guide the jury in weighing aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances”).  For California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003) (“[T]he trier 
of fact . . . shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”) (emphasis added).  
For Idaho, see State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 154 (Idaho 2008) (“[T]he jury is to . . . 
conduct the weighing process of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine if the 
defendant should be sentenced to death.”).  For Indiana, see IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(1) 
(West 2016) (proposed legislation) (“Before a sentence may be imposed under this section, 
the jury . . . must find that . . . any mitigating circumstances that exists are outweighed by 
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.”) (emphasis added).  For Mississippi, see 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (West 2017) (proposed legislation) (“the jury shall 
deliberate . . . [as to w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which outweigh 
the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and . . . [b]ased on these considerations, 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, life imprisonment without 
eligibility for parole, or death”) (emphasis added).  For Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 
175.554(3) (2016) (a jury “may impose a sentence of death only if it finds . . . that there are 
no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances found”) (emphasis added).  For New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 630:5(IV) (2016) (“The jury shall consider . . . whether the aggravating factors found to
exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist . . . Based upon 
this consideration, if the jury concludes that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors . . . the jury . . . may recommend that a sentence of death be imposed.”) (emphasis 
added).  For Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.11 (2016) (“Unless . . . it is 
found that any . . . aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more 
mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed.”) (emphasis added).  For 
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not require weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances but, in various forms, have the jury more or less 
consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
decide whether to impose death, again without any standard for 
making their decision.111  Three additional states do not require 
weighing but require the jury to answer certain questions—such 
as whether the defendant is a future danger—before imposing 
the death penalty.112 
Pennsylvania, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (2016) (proposed legislation) (“The 
verdict must be a sentence of death . . . if the jury unanimously finds one or more 
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.”) (emphasis 
added).  For the U.S. Government, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)(3) (2012) (“[T]he jury . . . shall 
consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh 
all of the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death”) 
(emphasis added).  Additionally, as of 2017, after the Alabama legislature eliminated the 
power of the judge to override a jury’s sentence to life, see supra note 109, Alabama is a 
weighing state.  See Ala. Code. 1975 § 13A-5-46 (e) (2017) (“[I]f the jury determines that 
one or more aggravating circumstances . . . exist and that they outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances, if any, it shall return a verdict of death.”). 
111.  For Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(a) (West 2016) (“Where . . . a 
person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death 
shall not be imposed unless the jury verdict includes a finding of at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed.  Where a 
statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the 
court shall sentence the accused to death.”).  For Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.025(1)(b) (proposed legislation) (“[T]he jury shall . . . determine whether any 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances . . . exist and [shall] recommend a sentence for the 
defendant.”).  For Louisiana, see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (2016) (“A 
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any 
mitigating circumstances, determines that the sentence of death should be imposed.”).  For 
South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (proposed legislation) (“In the 
[sentencing] proceeding, if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant 
must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment . . . In the sentencing proceeding, 
the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation 
of the punishment.”); Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 815 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that South 
Carolina is a non-weighing state)).  For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
27A-1 (2016) (“[I]n all cases for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge 
shall consider, or shall include in instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating 
circumstances and any . . . aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the 
evidence.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (2016) (“If, upon a trial by jury, a person 
is convicted of a Class A felony, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury 
verdict at the presentence hearing includes a finding of at least one aggravating 
circumstance and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed.”). 
112.  For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B), (d) (2017).  For Texas, see 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b), (c) (West 2015).  For Virginia, see VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (West 2016).  Oregon and Texas, under the provisions noted 
here, both require the jury to determine whether there is a probability the defendant will 
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The courts that explicitly considered the application of 
Apprendi and Ring to the weighing decision were also divided 
(leading to some of the divisions just described).  Five state 
supreme courts held that Apprendi applied to the weighing 
determination, i.e., that a jury must find that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt before it can impose the death penalty.113 
On the other hand, ten state courts and four federal circuits 
held that Apprendi is inapplicable to the weighing process.  
Some courts clung to the limits of Ring’s narrow holding as 
applying only to the finding of aggravating factors.114  Most 
reasoned that the weighing process was not a fact-finding one,115 
commit criminal acts making him a future danger, and must decide this probability 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” but this conflation of two standards—probability and 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” presents its own problems.  See infra notes 174-77 and 
accompanying text. 
113.  Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (finding a jury—
rather than a three-judge panel—must “be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any 
mitigating factors did not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors.”); State v. 
Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 410 (Conn. 2003) (finding “the jury must be instructed that it must be 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors and that, therefore, it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the 
appropriate punishment in this case”); Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-34 (Del. 2016) 
(holding statute unconstitutional where judge, not jury, weighs aggravators and mitigating 
circumstances and fails to require that aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261-62 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc) (reasoning that the finding that the aggravators outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances is a finding of fact under Ring); Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo. 
2003) (“If the jury is to be instructed to ‘weigh,’ . . . the burden of negating this mitigating 
evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the State.”).  See also 
McLaughlin v. Steele, 173 F. Supp. 3d 855, 896 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (granting habeas relief 
where jury did not unanimously find mitigating evidence failed to outweigh aggravating 
factors, a finding of fact and therefore a violation of Ring). 
114.  See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 821 (Ill. 2002) (noting Ballard’s 
“complaint concern[ed] mitigating, not aggravating, factors” and though it was bound by 
this Court’s precedents, it was “not bound to extend the decisions . . .”). 
115.  United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The result [of 
weighing] is one of judgment, of shades of gray . . . the judgment is . . . not a finding of 
fact, but a moral judgment”); United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“the requisite weighing [provision of the Federal Death Penalty Act] constitutes a process, 
not a fact to be found”); People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1155 (Cal. 2003) (“[Because] the 
penalty phase determination in California is normative, not factual,” the jury need not find 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt); Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151-52 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he weighing process is not 
a fact-finding one based on evidence”); Com v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 360 (Pa. 2005) 
(“[B]ecause the weighing of the evidence is a function distinct from fact-finding, Apprendi 
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but something else:  a “normative one,”116 or “a moral or legal 
judgment.”117 Others reasoned that the weighing process does 
not increase the maximum punishment.118  As we will see, these 
protestations have little merit.119 
The bottom line is a deep division in the states as to the role 
and placement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  In 
Hurst v. Florida, the Court signaled trouble for those states that 
do not apply the standard to all factual findings required for 
imposition of a death sentence, all of which must be found by a 
jury, not a judge. 
does not apply here.”); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 534 (N.M. 2005) (“[T]he balancing 
process is not ‘a fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is 
charged’ such that it would invoke the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt”); State v. Longo, 148 P.3d 892, 906 (Or. 2006) (holding that the 
weighing “does not involve any determination of fact”). 
116.  People v. Merriman, 332 P.3d 1187, 1265 (Cal. 2014) (“[D]etermining the 
balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation and the appropriate penalty do not entail 
the finding of facts but rather a single fundamentally normative assessment . . . that is 
outside the scope of Ring and Apprendi.”). 
117.  Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002) (“[T]he weighing process 
is not a factual determination . . . [but] instead, it is a moral or legal judgment that takes 
into account a theoretically limitless set of facts and that cannot be reduced to a scientific 
formula or the discovery of a discrete, observable datum.”); Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 
235, 251 (Nev. 2011) (overruling previous decision that held weighing to be a factual 
determination because it is instead a moral judgment); Ohio v. Belton, No. 2012-0902, 
2016 WL 1592786, at *9 (Ohio Apr. 20, 2016) (finding that the weighing process “is not a 
fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment” but that it “amounts to a complex 
moral judgment about what penalty to impose upon a defendant who is already death-
penalty eligible”); see also United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he jury’s decision that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is not a 
finding of fact [but rather] it is a ‘highly subjective,’ ‘largely moral judgment’ ‘regarding 
the punishment that a particular person deserves . . .’”); United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 
1079, 1107-08 (10th Cir. 2007) (following the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Fields). 
118.  Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004) (“The outcome of weighing 
does not increase eligibility . . . [and] is therefore not required to be found by a jury under a 
reasonable doubt standard.”).  But see id. at 273 (Rucker, J., dissenting in part, concurring 
in part) (“The plain language of Indiana’s capital sentencing scheme makes death 
eligibility contingent upon certain findings that must be weighed by the jury . . . [T]hey are 
at a minimum the type of findings anticipated by Apprendi and Ring and thus require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 626-27 (Neb. 2003) 
(“These [weighing] determinations cannot increase the potential punishment to which a 
defendant is exposed as a consequence of the eligibility determination.”); Torres v. State, 
58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (“It is [the aggravating factor] finding, not the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that authorizes jurors to consider 
imposing a sentence of death.”).  
119.  See infra notes 142-182 and accompanying text. 
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B. Hurst v. Florida 
In 2016, the Court decided Hurst v. Florida120 and struck 
down Florida’s capital penalty scheme for violating Hurst’s right 
to a jury trial.121  Its strict holding is a narrow one—a  simple 
application of Ring to Florida’s scheme.  However, Justice 
Sotomayor chose to use language signaling a larger problem 
with many more state schemes’ compliance with the right to a 
jury and findings beyond a reasonable doubt, such that Florida, 
for one, chose to honor that signaling on remand, at least in part. 
Florida was (and still is) a “weighing state,” where the 
scheme was that the sentencer had to find that an aggravating 
factor existed beyond a reasonable doubt per Ring, and then had 
to find that any aggravating factor or factors outweighed any 
mitigating circumstances before death could be imposed.122  The 
jury gave only an advisory verdict, and the judge could ignore it 
completely, deciding aggravating factors and mitigating 
circumstances, their weight, and the sentence.123  The narrow 
question presented by the appellant in Hurst was, per Ring, 
whether a jury, rather than a judge, must find aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.124  Justice Sotomayor 
gave that a one sentence “yes” at the end of her discussion for 
the Court.125  But that narrow, one-sentence conclusion was 
eclipsed by her broader discussion. 
For seven members of the Court, Justice Sotomayor 
consistently repeated and emphasized that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”126  She did not use 
120.  136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
121.  Id. at 619. 
122.  Id. at 620. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 621. 
125.  Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the 
judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore 
unconstitutional.”).  The Court overruled Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and 
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), in that they held that the Sixth Amendment did 
not require that findings authorizing the death penalty be made by a jury.  Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 
at 623 (expressly overruling cases “in relevant part”). 
126.  Id. at 619. 
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only the words “aggravating factors,” but instead used the words 
“findings” or “factual findings.”127  In condemning Florida’s 
scheme, she wrote, “Florida does not require the jury to make 
the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”128  
She quoted the statute:  “Notwithstanding the recommendation 
of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence 
of life imprisonment or death.”129  Further, if the court imposes 
death, it must “set forth in writing its findings upon which the 
sentence of death is based.”130  “The trial court alone must find 
the facts . . . ‘[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ 
and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’”131 
Indicating that the weighing decision was part of the 
“findings” that a jury must find, she quoted Walton v. Arizona: 
It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, 
but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to 
the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.  A 
Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s 
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does 
a trial judge in Arizona.132 
We can assume the Justice chose her words carefully133 and 
that the six Justices joining the opinion would have balked at the 
127.  Id. at 622. 
128.  Id. (emphasis added). 
129.  Id. at 620 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)) (emphasis added). 
130.  Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (2017)) 
(emphasis added). 
131.  Id. at 622 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)) (emphasis on “alone” in 
original; remaining emphasis added). 
132.  Id. at 622 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)). 
133.  Her language is fully consistent with her dissenting opinion from denial of 
certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 405 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
At the time of the opinion, until new legislation passed in 2017, see supra note 109, 
Alabama allowed a judge to override a jury’s decision on the sentence.  Id. at 406.  There, 
she condemned the scheme and wrote that the “required finding that the aggravating factors 
of a defendant’s crime outweigh the mitigating factors . . . is necessary to impose the death 
penalty.”  Id. at 410-11.  This parallels her language that “Florida does not require the jury 
to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”  Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 
622. 
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broadness of the “factual findings” language if they did not 
agree with the signaling effect of this dictum.  The next domino 
to fall in line, if presented to the Court, would be an application 
of the reasonable doubt standard to a jury’s decision that 
aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances. 
C. Kansas v. Carr Does Not Derail Hurst’s Sixth 
Amendment Train 
In the same term as Hurst, an opinion that Justice Scalia 
joined, Justice Scalia penned an opinion in Kansas v. Carr,134 
where he held for eight members of the Court (with Justice 
Sotomayor dissenting) that the Eighth Amendment did not 
require that the jury be instructed that mitigating circumstances 
need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.135  Lest there be 
any confusion that Hurst cannot be reconciled with Carr, it must 
be emphasized that Carr is not a Sixth Amendment case and, in 
fact, what it does say about the Sixth Amendment is consistent 
with Hurst. 
The Court in Carr rejected the defendant’s argument that 
the instructions may have confused the jury by emphasizing that 
the instructions given, and required by Kansas’s statutory 
scheme, “ma[de] clear that both the existence of aggravating 
circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating 
circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”136  
Hence, Kansas’ statutory scheme complies with the Sixth 
Amendment, as considered in the broad contours of Hurst, 
because the jury is required not only to determine the existence 
of an aggravating circumstance but also that aggravators 
outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt.137 
Justice Scalia mused in dicta in Carr that “we doubt 
whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof to the 
134.  136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). 
135.  Id. at 643-44. 
136.  Id. at 643. 
137.  Id.; see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173 (2006) (“In contrast, the 
Kansas statute requires the State to bear the burden of proving to the jury, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that aggravators are not outweighed by mitigators.”). 
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mitigating-factor determination,”138 calling it “largely a 
judgment call.”139  He also offered that the weighing 
determination “is mostly a question of mercy,” and “[i]t would 
mean nothing, we think, to tell the jury that the defendants must 
deserve mercy beyond a reasonable doubt.”140  While the Eighth 
Amendment requires no such finding, the Sixth Amendment 
does.141  Clearly, Kansas thought it possible for such a weighing 
to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.  And, as was discussed 
above and to which this Article turns again below, the history of 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard shows it was meant for 
exactly such “judgment calls.”  It was given to the jury as a tool 
of moral comfort in making a life or death decision. 
IV. THE LOGICAL PROGRESSION FROM HURST
In compliance with Apprendi and its progeny, this Article 
submits the jury, and not a judge, must make all findings 
necessary to impose the death penalty, and it must make those 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.  As Blakely stated, “the 
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the 
maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”142  
What are those findings?  In weighing states, it is the finding of 
an aggravator, it is the finding that aggravators outweigh 
mitigating circumstances, and it is the finding that even then, 
death is the appropriate punishment.143  In non-weighing states, 
138.  136 S. Ct. at 642. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Also inapposite here is Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995), which rejected 
“the notion that ‘a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a 
capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.’”  Id. at 512 (citation omitted). 
Harris was an Eighth Amendment decision and one decided before Apprendi.  It is 
doubtful Harris stands for anything with regard to the Sixth Amendment, and is no longer 
viable after Apprendi and Hurst. 
142.  542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). 
143.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.554(2) (West 2016).  Some weighing 
states have these three separate stages while most end the inquiry if the jury finds the 
aggravators outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  See, e.g., Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 
3, 19-20 (Ind. 2015) (holding that there was no sentencing error when the jury and trial 
court imposed a death sentence upon determining that the aggravating factors outweighed 
any mitigating factors); Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 607-08 (Pa. 2014) 
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the schemes vary, but the endpoint is the same, all findings, 
including the finding that death is the appropriate punishment, 
must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the scheme lacks 
this ultimate finding as a separate question for the jury, then the 
scheme violates the Sixth Amendment.  This conclusion is 
greatly enhanced by the death-specific study of the history of 
jury trials and of the reasonable doubt standard. 
A. Weighing Determinations 
Florida had to immediately grapple with Hurst.  On 
remand, the Supreme Court of Florida read Hurst’s tea leaves 
and required that the jury, and not the judge, make the critical 
weighing findings necessary before imposition of a death 
sentence.144  Therefore, the court held that a jury was to decide 
the existence of each aggravating factor; the finding “that the 
aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death”; and the 
finding that “aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
circumstances.”145  However, the Florida court simultaneously 
misunderstood that complete compliance with Apprendi and 
Hurst’s logical next steps requires that all findings must not only 
be made by a jury but must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Florida Supreme Court held that only the first of the three 
findings must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, per Ring, 
and did not require the standard for the other findings.146  Hence, 
Florida joins the weighing states that do not require all findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt.147 
(finding that the jury clearly determined that aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating 
factors and that a death sentence was properly imposed).  The problem with the latter state 
schemes, and the reason why jurors should be given an opportunity even after the weighing 
to make the decision up or down, is that, too often, an inadequate defense attorney presents 
little in mitigation.  Jurors may well find that statutory aggravators literally “outweigh” the 
non-existent or minimally existent mitigating circumstances in a botched robbery attempt, 
for example, but still believe death is not proportional to the offense.  
144.  Hurst v. Florida, 202 So. 3d 40, 57 (Fla. 2016). 
145.  Id. at 53. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Most of the opinion is devoted to another core component of the jury trial right 
in capital cases—unanimity.  Whereas the previous statute had not required unanimity in 
the death verdict, the Florida Supreme Court delved into history to outlaw this practice and 
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All “weighing states” save two148 require that the finding 
that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors must 
precede a decision to impose death; life is the default 
punishment absent the weighing.149  As for the two outliers, such 
burden-shifting violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial and the right to have the prosecution carry the burden of 
proof on factual findings leading to a death sentence beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In any event, the finding that aggravators 
outweigh mitigating circumstances is necessary to make a 
defendant eligible for death and hence must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.150 
What of the arguments by state and federal courts, 
referenced above,151 that “weighing” is not a finding of fact but a 
“normative,” “moral,” or “legal” judgment?  It is certainly true 
that any “weighing” the jury does is more normative than 
factual.  No one would believe that the jurors in a capital case sit 
in the jury room with a scale, with aggravators on one side and 
mitigating circumstances on the other.  How would one weigh 
the aggravating factor that the crime was heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel (a “normative” issue if ever there was one) against the 
mitigating circumstances of the youthful age and lack of record 
of the offender?  How might one weigh the elderly status of the 
victim against the extreme distress or mental handicap of the 
defendant?  In making its weighing finding, the jury most likely 
uses its moral sense after looking at the entire picture painted for 
them by the litigants.  This does not mean Apprendi does not 
apply. 
find a unanimous death verdict to be a critical component of the jury trial right.  Id. at 54-
59. 
148.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(G) (2016) (“At the penalty phase, the 
defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of 
whether there is mitigation that us sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(e) (West 2017) (“If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds . . . that the 
existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating 
circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death; 
otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”). 
149.  See id. 
150.  See id. 
151.  See supra notes 115-117. 
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Cabining Apprendi to only findings of fact, and not all 
findings a jury must make, whatever their flavor, is too literal an 
interpretation of that case and of the right to a jury trial.  While 
the holding of Apprendi discusses facts that increase the 
maximum punishment, that does not mean Apprendi applies 
only to facts.  The Court has repeatedly demonstrated that “the 
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect”:152  findings 
“essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the 
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of 
the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”153  The jury’s finding that 
aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances is a necessary 
finding before death may be imposed.  The finding is “essential 
to the level of punishment that the defendant receives.”154 
Hurst’s language signals that this is the case, although it 
does shoehorn the weighing into a “factual finding”:  “Florida 
does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary 
to impose the death penalty,”155 and: 
It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, 
but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to 
the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.  A 
Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s 
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does 
a trial judge in Arizona.156 
The clear signal of Hurst is that, if the issue were directly 
presented to the Court, it would decide that the weighing 
determination is subject to the Sixth Amendment and therefore 
is a finding that must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
It is worthy of note here that many of the findings we ask 
the jury to make are not clearly just “factual.”  Jurors may find 
as fact that the defendant killed the victim but their finding as to 
152.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000). 
153.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
154.  Id. 
155.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (emphasis added). 
156.  Id. at 622 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)). 
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the defendant’s mens rea—e.g., whether he killed negligently, 
whether he killed with “malice aforethought”—is a normative, 
evaluative one.157  Jurors apply facts to law and make judgments, 
evaluations, opinions, and conclusions.  Ultimately, to decide 
“guilt” beyond a reasonable doubt is not a factual finding but a 
judgment or opinion.158  That is what the weighing determination 
is. 
Additionally, the history of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard set out above demonstrates that its very essence is to 
provide a guide in moral, not factual, decisions.  To say that 
weighing is “normative” or is a “judgment” speaks to the very 
origins of the reasonable doubt standard.  As James Whitman 
unearthed, it emanated from an obsession with “doubt and 
death.”159  It counterbalanced a standard of no doubt, giving the 
jury breathing room to make difficult, moral decisions in matters 
of life and death. 
Under this interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, the 
death penalty statutes in the weighing states that do not require 
that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravators 
outweigh mitigating circumstances before death may be 
imposed are all invalid.160  Assuming each of these states would 
pass new statutes that comply with the requirement, there may 
be a question whether the standard makes a difference.  There is 
in fact evidence of a correlative impact between the heightened 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt and death verdicts.  In 
2014, there were seventy-three death sentences in the United 
157.  See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the 
Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 562-63 (2011) (making the 
point that a jury deciding guilt on the elements of negligent homicide must make “some 
very non-factual, subjective, even moral assessments about the defendant”). 
158.  Notably, the Court has wrangled with the term “factual findings” in the context 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and found it did not necessarily denote just “facts” but 
could include conclusions and opinions drawn from facts.  See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. 
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (holding that “factual findings” includes opinions and 
noting “the analytical difficulty of drawing . . . a line [between fact and opinion]”). 
159.  Whitman, supra note 44, at 157. 
160.  See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
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States in only twenty states.161  All but seven of these were 
imposed in states that did not require the jury to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating circumstances (or that death was the 
appropriate punishment).162 
In 2015, there were forty-nine death sentences imposed, 
and three states imposed more than half of those death 
sentences:  Alabama (6), Florida (9) and California (14).163  If 
we add Pennsylvania and Texas to Alabama, Florida, and 
California, these five states produced the most death verdicts in 
the country between 2012 and 2015,164 and none of them 
required that the jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances 
(or that death was the appropriate punishment).165  In Alabama 
and Florida, the jury did not even make the decision but only 
rendered an advisory verdict.166  Of the forty-nine death 
sentences, all but four of these were imposed in states that did 
not require the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating 
circumstances, or that death was the appropriate punishment.167 
Even if there were not this correlation, the “reasonable 
doubt” standard is a fundamental component of our criminal 
justice system.  Underscoring the importance of the high 
standard of proof in a criminal trial, the Court has found that a 
constitutionally deficient instruction on the meaning of 
reasonable doubt can never be harmless and requires automatic 
161.  See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-
states-1977-present [https://perma.cc/W7PQ-FVPN]. 
162.  Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty 
Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 208 (1991). 
163.  See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra 
note 161. 
164.  See id. 
165.  See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text. 
166.  See supra note 109 (stating Alabama allowed judicial override of a jury’s life 
verdict until the legislature eliminated it in 2017). 
167.  See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra 
note 161. 
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reversal.168  In Cage v. Louisiana,169 the Court summarily 
reversed a conviction based upon use of the phrases “actual 
substantial doubt” and “grave uncertainty,” which suggested a 
“higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the 
reasonable-doubt standard.”170  While debates over its phrasing 
rage, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is a core 
Constitutional right. 
B. Non-Weighing Determinations 
The typical non-weighing state statute substitutes the 
weighing terminology with the requirement that the jury must 
find an aggravator and more or less “consider” any mitigating 
evidence when deciding if death is the appropriate 
punishment.171  Hence, in states like Georgia, Louisiana, and 
South Dakota, the jury is instructed it must find that at least one 
aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt (per 
Ring), and then it must consider any mitigating evidence 
presented in deciding whether the death penalty should be 
imposed.172 
It would appear jurors have unbridled discretion at this 
point to decide life or death without any reference to 
“weighing.”  However, as the Supreme Court itself has noted, 
“The [weighing/non-weighing] terminology is somewhat 
misleading, since we have held that in all capital cases the 
sentencer must be allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances 
that arguably justify a death sentence against the defendant’s 
mitigating evidence.”173  Therefore, back in the jury room, things 
likely look no different than in weighing states.  Jurors are 
looking at all of the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
factors put before them and making a holistic determination 
168.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1993). 
169.  498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
170.  Id. at 40-41. 
171.  Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[D]rawing an arbitrary line in the sand between the ‘eligibility and selection phases’ of 
the sentencing decision is, in my view, incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure.”). 
172.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(a) (West 2016); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 905.3 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2016). 
173.  Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216-17 (2006). 
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whether death is appropriate under the circumstances.  Jurors in 
these non-weighing states are doing the same thing they are 
doing in weighing states.  The difference is they do not officially 
make an intermediate determination but simply come out for or 
against death.  For the same reasons outlined for weighing states 
and for the reasons outlined in the next section, the jurors here 
too should be instructed that they have to make this decision 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Three states do require jurors to make intermediate 
determinations.174  Taking Texas as an example, particularly 
because it is so problematic, the jury must decide “whether there 
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”175 
and must decide this probability beyond a reasonable doubt.176  
If the jury finds this, then they must find that death should be 
imposed unless “there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or 
circumstances to warrant . . . a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole . . . .”177  There is inherent confusion in 
instructing a jury to find a probability beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This provision not only lowers the constitutional 
standard but it then forces the jury’s hand to find death without 
benefit of the standard of making the prosecution prove it is 
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt.  This forced scheme is 
far from the jury trial right given the community for hundreds of 
years, giving jurors the protection of a standard to make a moral 
decision that only they are authorized to make. 
C. Death as the Appropriate Punishment 
Does the Hurst language also logically lead to a Sixth 
Amendment requirement that the jury must find, after all other 
findings are made, that, under the circumstances, death is the 
appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt?  As already 
noted, a few state statutes isolate this as a final question for the 
174.  See supra note 112 (referencing Oregon, Texas and Virginia).  
175.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 2013). 
176.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 37.071(c).   
177.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e)(1). 
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jurors after weighing, but many do not.  If the statute does 
isolate the issue, there is no coherent reason why this question 
should be treated any differently than the questions that precede 
it.  Hurst says that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a 
judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of 
death,”178 but then goes on to soften “facts” into “findings.”179  
That death is appropriate is a finding necessary to impose death, 
and so it seems under Hurst’s logic that it must be made by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, very few states 
isolate this as a separate step and it is unclear Hurst goes that far 
yet.  However, Hurst emanates from Apprendi, and Apprendi 
interprets the Sixth Amendment according to its historical roots.  
The historical roots of the jury trial right and its attendant 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard answer the question at the 
top of this paragraph “yes.” 
History demonstrates the community’s right to decide 
punishment in a capital case, and the right to have a standard to 
apply—death beyond a reasonable doubt—to protect its moral 
conscience.  History counsels that states have to give the 
community the ultimate question separately from any and all 
steps that come before.  The beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
had as its target the moral conscience of jurors in deciding 
whether to put a man to death:  that was its raison d’être.  Both 
the standard and the requirement of twelve unanimous jurors 
were “moral comfort” tools for those who were put to the task of 
deciding whether a man should be executed.  The standard was 
aimed at punishment, not fact finding. 
There is no reason to believe jurors do not need that moral 
comfort today as well in capital cases.  It is an awesome 
decision, and to ask them to make it without giving them an 
instruction on a standard is to leave them rudderless and 
uncertain.  There is evidence that jurors who sit in capital cases 
and return death verdicts suffer great anxiety long after the 
178.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). 
179.  Id. at 622. 
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verdict is returned.180  They have a right to answer the life or 
death question with a standard to guide them.  Two states have 
gotten this right:  Delaware and Utah. 
Delaware was a state where the jury gave an advisory 
opinion and the judge could ignore it.181  Post-Hurst, the 
Delaware Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional in 
Rauf v. State.182  The court, in a per curiam opinion, not only 
decided to read Hurst broadly and understood it to mean that all 
factual findings had to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but Chief Justice Strine, writing for a plurality, found that 
the Sixth Amendment required a jury to make the ultimate 
determination of death beyond a reasonable doubt: 
I find it impossible to embrace a reading of Hurst that 
judicially draws a limit to the right to a jury in the death 
penalty context to having the jury make only the 
determinations necessary to make the defendant eligible to 
be sentenced to death by someone else, rather than to make 
the determinations itself that must be made if the defendant 
is in fact to receive a death sentence.  I am unable to discern 
in the Sixth Amendment any dividing line between the 
decision that someone is eligible for death and the decision 
that he should in fact die.183 
Justice Strine engaged in a lengthy discussion of the 
hundreds of years of history of the role of the jury in capital 
cases, noting that “[t]he proposition that any defendant should 
go to his death without a jury of his peers deciding that should 
happen would have been alien to the Founders.”184  He 
concluded that when the Supreme Court required in Hurst “a 
jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a 
180.  See Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for Jurors in 
Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333, 1338 n.21 (1993) (noting jurors have 
emotional trouble after capital trials). 
181.  See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434-35 (Del. 2016). 
182.  Id. at 434.  The Delaware Attorney General’s office will not appeal the ruling. 
Delaware Attorney General Will Not Appeal Decision Striking Down Death Penalty 
Statute, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6531 
[https://perma.cc/E4M2-JAP3].  Hence, as of today, Delaware no longer has the death 
penalty. 
183.  Rauf, 145 A.3d at 436. 
184.  Id. 
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sentence of death,”185 it was aware that, “[i]f those words mean 
what they say, they extend the role of a death penalty jury 
beyond the question of eligibility” but to selectivity.186  
Therefore, the Constitution required that a jury of twelve must 
unanimously decide death beyond a reasonable doubt for it to be 
imposed. 
As the only state that explicitly requires that jurors make a 
separate finding that death is the appropriate punishment beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the Utah Supreme Court defended this 
standard in a straightforward way, not attempting to shoehorn it 
into a factual finding: 
The ultimate purpose in the penalty phase is not one of 
factfinding, but the fixing of a penalty, and the fixing of a 
penalty is a matter of judgment about what penal 
consequences should attach to the commission of a capital 
crime by a particular defendant.  The reasonable doubt 
standard is, of course, also employed as a standard for 
factfinding; but that standard, which is only used when the 
most basic interests are at stake, also conveys to a decision 
maker a sense of the solemnity of the task and the necessity 
for a high degree of certitude, given the nature of the values 
to be weighed, in imposing the death sentence.187 
The fixing of a penalty is exactly what jurors were doing 
when the jury trial right and the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard were being refined during the years of the founding of 
our nation.  Utah seems to have gotten it exactly right. 
A study of the history of the jury trial right and the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard show that in capital cases they were 
not tied so tightly to the “fact finding” language of Apprendi, 
Ring, and Hurst.  Rather, at the time of the founding of our 
nation, and there is no reason it should be different now, the 
community, in the form of a jury, decided whether men would 
live or die, and for that bald decision, they had the moral 
protection of a reasonable doubt standard. 
185.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). 
186.  Rauf, 145 A.3d at 464. 
187.  State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 (Utah 1982). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court opened a window on the jury trial right 
in Apprendi v. New Jersey and has continued to prop it open.  
Through that window came Hurst v. Florida, where Justice 
Sotomayor signaled the Court’s willingness to entertain further 
applications of the right in capital cases.  While it is clear from 
Ring v. Arizona and Hurst that the jury must find any 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, Hurst indicates 
that the jury trial right would attach to any findings necessary 
for imposition of death.  That would mean, at the very least, that 
jurors in “weighing” states would have to find the aggravators 
outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Less clear from the Court’s decision and Apprendi’s 
applications is whether it also means that before death may be 
imposed, a jury must find the penalty appropriate beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This Article used a historical approach to this 
question, as the Court has done in interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial right.  In capital cases, for hundreds of 
years, it has been the right of the community, and not a judge, to 
decide on the penalty of death.  Because this was, and still is, 
such an awesome decision, philosophers and legal thinkers in 
the eighteenth century minted the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard to protect the jurors’ moral consciences in the 
imposition of this draconian punishment.  Ironically, given how 
it is viewed today, it was designed to make imposition easier, as 
jurors were reluctant to impose it with no guidance lest they 
suffer great harm were they to sentence to death an innocent 
man. 
Jurors today, no less than yesterday, should have the 
guidance of a standard—one held so important as to require 
reversal if misstated in noncapital cases—on which to decide 
life or death.  It is surely grotesque to constitutionally require a 
jury find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a fraud case but to 
have no such constitutional requirement in a case where a man 
or woman’s life hangs in the balance.  It is both an individual 
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and collective concern for the criminal justice system and the 
Court has the means and, perhaps the will, to address it. 
